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William Robinson’s paper is as acute and illuminating as his previous work. He provides a 
useful account of contemporary global capitalism: its skewed rewards and punitive horrors, 
its central dynamic (expansionary and all-subsuming, increasingly incompatible with a 
habitable planet), and its governing tendencies (the simultaneous decentralisation of 
production chains and centralisation of economic power). In his vision, the world is ruled by 
a transnational capitalist class (TCC) whose business promiscuously traverses national 
boundaries, forging a new world of global value chains, and it is busy constructing a 
transnational state (TNS) to serve itself. Together these have scythed away obstacles to the 
power of capital, and have used their power (in which the possibility of ‘exit’ and global 
arbitrage can subvert any national policies seeking to re-ensnare them) to impose harsh 
regimes of insecurity and market-dependence worldwide. 
He is surely right in his critique of the hollowness of the corporate rhetoric of equality and 
social responsibility. Who would credit Schwab’s WEF, or the IMF (or any other candidate for 
the proto-executive of global capitalism) with the will or capacity to remedy the structural 
contradictions of the world economy—over-accumulation, deflationary forces, depressed 
demand, ballooning private and public debt, ubiquitous economic insecurity and inequality, 
polarisation between surplus and deficit nations, as well as asset bubbles and financial crises 
and a generalised financial volatility driven by all these and by the reckless speculation of 
casino finance? 
The global elite recognises the seriousness of these structural problems. They also (stung by 
the so-called ‘populist revolt’) are dimly sensing the social damage done, and rage 
engendered, by the forces of global neoliberalism. But their diagnoses tend to depict this 
blowback as the revival of dark exogenous forces—not really the result of liberal capitalism, 
even if perhaps exacerbated by its volatility and by resentment of the ‘losers’. Even moderate 
critics realise that managing the strains of neoliberal globalism requires a level of co-
ordination, probably a return to social democracy and an ethos of macroeconomic 
management and redistribution (now on a world scale), that would require the collective will, 
understanding and power that this elite clearly is incapable of contemplating (and we would 
claim, that no machinery of global governance has the power to enact). The difficulty, then, 
lies not simply in the continued grip of neoliberalism (now in ‘zombie’ mode) but in the fact 
that social democracy was only ever a project of nation states—and even that project proved 
incapable of containing the forces of socio-economic disruption generated by the 
capitalist/market system that it was helping to rehabilitate. 
On this, we suspect Robinson would agree: The TCC and TNS lack the vision or will for a 
solution. We would also argue they lack the power to enact the deep structural fixes needed 
even to tilt capitalism back to the (temporary) balance it once seemed to achieve, between the 
private corporate sphere and some semblance of social and political (and international) 
stability. We are probably in agreement, then, that the TCC cannot solve, and actively 
subverts, even such a minimally ‘socialising’ project for capitalism. But we would press the 
point further. What if the TCC’s structural disunity serves to make world problems more 
intense and intractable, geopolitically and economically? 
Robinson’s argument is that capitalism has moved through different phases in the movement 
toward its current unity. But there may be reasons to doubt both some details of his historical 
account and his diagnosis of the current situation. 
He proposes that from the late nineteenth century capitalism was ‘national corporate’ in 
character—the world economy consisted of “an aggregation of ‘national’ economies.” The 
subsequent phase commenced in the 1970s with the globalisation of production and finance, 
heralding the rise of “truly transnational capital,” (the TCC and TNS). Having been “liberated 
from the nation state,” transnational capital has gained unprecedented mobility. This endows 
the TCC with a terrible power, as displayed in the post-2008 evisceration of Greece. Those 
who resist “face an amorphous, moving target.” 
The case is powerful and elegantly crafted but the current era is partially mis-read and some 
elements are overstated. One such is the part played by Keynesianism in overcoming the 
Great Depression (a critical inflection point at the midpoint of Robinson’s national-corporatist 
century). Militarised accumulation was a more powerful lever—it was not the New Deal but 
war that raised the United States from its economic slough and made it the dominant 
economic force in the world. More problematic is Robinson’s dichotomy of national-corporate 
and global phases. Already in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the world economy 
was dominated by great powers that orchestrated regional and imperial economic flows, and, 
in Britain’s case, the global economy. The links weren’t simply through trade and capital 
flows; there was also the emergence of an international division of labour (e.g. the Atlantic 
slave-cotton-&c. triangle). The nation-state system was globalised initially through empires, 
most emphatically in the heyday of the imperial form which coincided with Robinson’s 
national-corporate era, and then, with the sudden collapse of empires (in a later phase of that 
same era), nation states were left as the dominant political form. In other words, ‘globalisation’ 
was present in the age of imperialism and of national-corporate capitalism too. 
So too was the transnational power of finance. The mediation of economic activity through 
contract, money, debt, securities &c. ensured that the appropriation of wealth by capitalists 
from workers was not transparent, as Robinson supposes, but multiply veiled (if not as 
extremely as today). Even in Adam Smith’s time, the bond holder engaged in tax arbitrage 
and could hold the whip hand over states. (He is, Smith reminds us, “a citizen of the world, 
and is apt to abandon the country in which he was exposed to a burdensome tax, and would 
remove his stock to some other country where he could either carry on his business, or enjoy 
his fortune more at ease.”) Debt was an effective tool of subjugation, and the control of Greece 
through debt is not an invention of the recent past, as Robinson implies, but is coeval with the 
Greek state itself. 
When turning to the current era, Robinson asks “What is new about global capitalism? Where 
are its fissures? What is its structure of power? And what viable forms of struggle from below 
for system change does this new epoch offer?” His answer to the first is the emergence of the 
TCC, which has been trying to position itself, “with limited success, as a new global ruling 
class.” What it has achieved is to gain power through nationally based elite factions, which 
then act as globalisation boosters, in the long-term interests of the TCC (a process brilliantly 
traced in Robinson’s earlier work). But this account of a political battle between globalist and 
national elite fractions makes economic globalisation appear more purposeful—the product 
of clear-cut elite factions—than the historical record suggests. The foundations of today’s 
globalised order were laid by Roosevelt, with New Deal apparatuses repurposed for 
America’s postwar hegemonic thrust. Even Stalin’s Kremlin, HQ of the most extreme state-
capitalist regime at the meridian of the national-corporate era, sought accelerated integration 
into the global economy, as Sanchez-Sibony has most recently shown. In other words, all 
major economic actors position themselves on national and global terrains and strategise 
accordingly; the capitalist class may not be easily split into two camps—globalist vs national—
but is a schizophrenic collectivity, forever forced to balance between, and politically decide 
on, strategies that contain endemic tensions and contrary elements. At any moment, fractions 
and organisations of this class may ally and lean towards specific geo-economic strategies—
but is there really a deep structural logic that confers on any strategy or geo-morphology of 
capital accumulation a fundamental irreversibility in terms of its geo-political-economy? We 
do not doubt the ‘logical’ promiscuity of capital with regard to place, nor the tendency to 
global expansion and integration, only whether this must produce political unity or an ‘open’ 
form of globalism. After all, it’s just as true to say that the age of corporate-national capital 
and even imperial conquest was also a refraction of globalising tendencies—but englobed by 
the international competition of states. 
Now we have certainly moved to a new world division of labour and geo-economy of capital 
accumulation—but have we left behind the mediation of this by the persisting power of 
national states? Notwithstanding Robinson’s concession that contemporary TCC-formation 
has been “limited”, and that “TNS apparatuses are fragmentary, with no center or formal 
constitution, and no transnational enforcement capacity,” his paper tends to overstate the 
level of social and political unity achieved. It’s certainly true that numerous forums and 
organisations (with varying levels of national government involvement, from the IMF, the 
WEF, the WTO, to the EU, and, we might add, trade-treaty proliferation) have been used to 
impose a ‘disciplinary regime’ that underpins gaping inequality, insecurity and a skewing of 
rewards to the 1%, all justified by neoliberal ideologies invoking ‘free markets’ (even though, 
as Robinson nicely illustrates, the reality is not free markets but a global pyramid of 
oligopolistic, interconnected politically powerful corporate behemoths). But the nation state 
still represents the key locus of political legitimacy and military power, and possesses 
formidable economic weight too. When Robinson proposes that a coalition of IGOs and 
“nation-states in which transnationally oriented elites have come to power” forms the TNS, 
we would caution that a great many nation states—say, China and the USA—are run by 
transnationally oriented elites without forming part of a TNS (at least if “S” is to have any 
agreed meaning at all). 
Again, why this matters boils down to analysis of the ‘fissures.’ In our conception, capitalism 
is constituted through articulations of the national and the global (and in the case of the EU, 
the regional). Consider for example the current strains in the world economy. They are 
producing winners and losers not just among classes but among members of the global elite. 
In response, the spend/tax/money-and-credit creating and other powers of government 
come into play. And despite the influence the TNS might have when everyone sings from the 
same hymn sheet, when they do not, it matters which (national) government you can call 
‘your own’. It may appear that you are floating free from national moorings, but an economic 
shock will usually provide the reality check—as RBS discovered when its 2009 collapse 
prompted it to come crying to its national state. Currently we are witnessing a high degree of 
co-ordination failure and dispute among the states at the core of what Robinson calls the TNS. 
After 2008, the German, Chinese and US governments divided bitterly over stimulus and 
money creation. The Eurozone is wracked by divergence between not just northern and 
southern states but Berlin and the IMF and the ECB. Meanwhile the EU pursues US IT 
corporates over competition policy and is rewarded by accusations that its game is really a 
persecution of US giants as covert EU industrial policy. 
And then there is Trump. Robinson’s paper is silent on the current ‘populist’ blowback. But 
this surely reminds us of the continued salience of national states, and the tendency of elites—
including business leaders with a global orientation—to play to the new nationalism. Of 
course we’re already seeing the hollowness of the populist turn. The talk of punishing 
plutocracy has given way to bribes, tax breaks and deregulation for Wall St, and the gossip 
from the boardrooms is that execs will find a way to fit with his ‘new order’—even if they 
have to partially reconfigure their global circuits of accumulation. And yet, the limitations of 
the ‘globalist’ project stand revealed, as does its vacuity. After all, capitalism’s ‘globalism’ is 
not really cosmopolitan. It is the expression of a lack of interest in local colour compared to 
the colour of money—one can as easily pose as a local loyalist as a cosmopolitan if one’s 
religion is money. That makes capitalists potentially globe-trotting liberals, but also anything 
else that permits money-making. 
Trump’s world policy is certainly a shift from American liberal imperialism (the drive to 
promote globalisation, as a twin to US geopolitical primacy). He seems to lean towards a new 
US nationalism and partial repudiation of (what is euphemistically termed) world 
‘leadership’. We have yet to see whether the US elite can and will overturn or blunt his project. 
But when globalists bemoan the ‘return of geopolitics and nationalism’ they must be 
forgetting that American power, and its promotion of its own version of ‘globalisation’ felt 
very ‘geopolitical’ to others—allies and rivals alike. The success of US leadership of globalism 
lay in its ability to persuade others in the TCC to buy into American-patronised globalism for 
the benefits they (certainly did) achieve. But it’s not clear that there is an irreversible consensus 
among the capitalist class that this leadership provides either the stability or benefits that 
justify going along with all of Washington’s projects. Is there really a well formed political 
unity in the TCC beyond the structures and agenda of US leadership that can develop a truly 
united TCC program, and one that can survive the Trump turn, the popular backlash and 
various current divergences of interest? 
Robinson underestimates the potential for ‘global’ capital to adapt to nationalism as the least-
worst alternative to class revolt against its own programme of neoliberal globalism. And 
haven’t we been here before? The interwar period feels suddenly nearer, and with it the story 
of how nationalism (of peoples and capital) could escalate, fed by a toxic mix of geopolitical 
conflict and liberal globalism. Certainly, eco-destruction seems more burning a prospect than 
another global military conflagration—no one yet fears that—but let’s not imagine that the 
‘globalist’ elite cannot fragment again, along new and old faultlines, sowing divisions among 
the rest as they go. 
In short, is the TCC really politically and globally cohered just because its value chains have 
gone global? If they have to choose between popular class rage or policies that can channel it 
away from their greed (and its welfare-corrosive consequences) and onto foreigners and 
migrants, might they not willingly pay the price of re-assuming the mantle of ‘national 
loyalty’? Capital has only one thing inscribed on its soul—endless accumulation. If for a while 
that was best sought with a programme of ‘globalism and openness’, that does not make 
capital truly (ethically) or structurally cosmopolitan. It’s proving difficult these days to make 
either liberal or left cosmopolitanism into a vote-winning ethical project. Progressives suffer 
from being trapped between nationalistic populism and a liberal cosmopolitanism that is 
structured by market interests. They struggle to preach world-fraternity while the millions 
who are angry at neoliberalism feel, however futilely, that the nation is the only port in a 
raging sea—the other havens having taken a battering from the neoliberal storm. In this 
scenario we, viewing any transnational elite reformism with a sceptical eye, find common 
cause with Robinson in his strategic prescriptions: for “radically transformative projects from 
below” while rebuilding those other essential havens—workplace solidarity, community 
cohesion, union strength—and a cosmopolitanism ‘from below’ that pushes against 
recrudescent xenophobic nationalism while having no truck with the ersatz cosmopolitanism 
of the globalist elite. For progressives, acting effectively while refusing to pander to either 
nationalist or globalist elite programmes is the challenge of the times. 
